Zoning-Production of Synthetic Compost as Farming by Brew, Eugene J., Jr.
Volume 63 
Issue 3 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 63, 
1958-1959 
3-1-1959 
Zoning-Production of Synthetic Compost as Farming 
Eugene J. Brew Jr. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra 
Recommended Citation 
Eugene J. Brew Jr., Zoning-Production of Synthetic Compost as Farming, 63 DICK. L. REV. 291 (1959). 
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol63/iss3/8 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more 
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu. 
ZONING-PRODUCTION OF SYNTHETIC COMPOST AS FARMING
In the recent case of Gaspari v. Muhlenberg Township Board of Adjust-
ment, 392 Pa. 7, 139 A.2d 544 (1958), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in
construing a township zoning ordinance, held that the production of artificial
manure, a synthetic compost used for growing mushrooms, was "farming in
all its branches."
Arthur Gaspari and his brothers owned 17 acres of land in Berks County,
Pennsylvania. Since 1929 the Gasparis had used the land for growing mush-
rooms. Prior to 1949 they had used horse manure as a growing medium for the
mushrooms, but with the decline in the availability of horse manure, were
forced to seek a substitute growing medium. In 1949 they began making
synthetic compost, an artificial horse manure, for their own use in the growing
of mushrooms, and in 1951 they began producing it for other mushroom
growers. The artificial compost was produced by a fifteen day process in which
cyanamid, potash, and gypsum were used to decompose the primary ingredients,
hay and corncobs. In the years 1953-1955 the Gaspari's annual production
averaged 700,000 square feet 1 of compost, with which they supplied thirty-four
growers in and around Berks County.
The Gaspari's land is located entirely within an area zoned as an "F" Farm
District by the Muhlenberg Township Zoning Ordinance, enacted June 4, 1943.2
Article III, Section 301 of this ordinance allows, among other activities, "farming
in all its branches." In August, 1955, the Township Building Inspector (Zoning
Officer) issued a cease and desist order charging the Gasparis with violation of
said Section 301, and ordered them to halt production of synthetic compost for
sale to other growers. Upon appeal of the Gasparis to the Muhlenberg Town-
' This was the only method of measurement used. The compost was not weighed. It is
therefore difficult to picture the actual amount produced annually. However, from testimony
taken before the Township Zoning Board of Adjustment it can be determined that the annual
production average for the years 1953-55 would fill 1300 standard size dump trucks.
2 "Section 300. In an 'F' Farm District the following regulations shall apply:
Section 301. A building may be erected, altered, or used, and a lot or premises
may be used for any of the following purposes and for no other:
1. One-family detached dwellings and their accessory uses.
2. Two-family dwellings and their accessory uses.
3. Farming in all its branches, including the erection or alteration of the usual
accessory farm buildings incidental to agriculture and animal husbandry.
4. Marketing or processing of farm products, where such use is accessory and inci-
dental to the raising of said products.
5. Quarrying operations.
6. Educational, religious, or philanthropic use.
7. Hospital or sanitarium, correctional institutions.
8. Public and private recreational use.
9. Automobile graveyards, tourist cabins, and boarding and lodging houses, when
authorized as special exceptions by the Board of Adjustment in 4ccQriamte with Article
XV of this Ordinance."
(2911
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ship Board of Adjustment a hearing was held and sworn testimony taken of
witnesses for the Gasparis and complaining citizens of the area in which they
conducted their operations.
These nearby residents testified that the process gave off unbearable,
noxious odors, strongest in the heat of the summer, giving them the choice of
closing all windows in the house and suffering from the heat, or opening them
and subjecting themselves to the odors. One property owner claimed that he
became sick and lost sleep as a result of the odors. There was also testimony that
the compost piles attracted and became a breeding place for flies and mos-
quitoes, and that nearby residents were unable to enjoy their porches in the
heat of the summer. A further complaint was that a particular type of fly
which bred in the piles was of a variety so small it could easily get through the
door and window screens of the residents. Other witnesses testified that the
water used to flush the compost piles often passed on to their land after it ran
off the piles, killing the grass and all other plant life in its way, and that it
polluted one neighbor's stream, killing the fish and leaving the stream with a
foul odor, like "rotten material." '
The Township Board of Adjustment affirmed the order of the Building
Inspector and decreed "That the appellants shall cease the manufacturer for
sale of synthetic compost ...... The Gasparis filed an appeal with the
Court of Common Pleas of Berks County. Shortly thereafter they requested
and were granted permission to have the record remanded to the Board of
Adjustment for the purpose of taking additional evidence on the theory
that the activities of the Gasparis were an extension of a manufacturing non-
conforming use which had existed prior to the adoption of the zoning ordinance
in question. In a supplemental decision the Board of Adjustment concluded that
the activities were not an extension of a prior nonconforming use. This
decision was also appealed to the Court of Common Pleas, and both were tried
together.
The final decision of the Common Pleas Court was delayed while the
parties attempted to work out a plan whereby the Gasparis would move their
business to another section of the township. Upon 'being advised that it was not
feasible for the appellants to move, the court rendered its decision: the business
of producing artificial compost was manufacturing and not farming, was an
activity dissimilar to the use of horse manure, was not a valid extension of a
prior nonconforming use, and was therefore in violation of the township
zoning ordinance.4
3 Transcript of Record, pp. 52a-64a, Gaspari v, Muhlenber_ Township Board of Adjustment,
392 Pa. 7, 139 A. 2d 544 (1958).
* O Berks 48 (1957).
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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed. Musmanno, J., speaking
for the majority, held the process of the appellants to be "well within the
ambit of 'farming in all its branches' " 5, and therefore not in violation of the
township zoning ordinance. In distinguishing the process from that involved in
other cases cited by appellees as being manufacturing, the court states that
a requirement of manufacturing is that a new product be formed, and that the
"newness must come about through the application of skill and labor, entirely
or mostly apart from what is done by Nature herself." "Nature" appears
to be the key word. The court seemingly precludes the possibility of a process
being manufacturing when a "natural", or chemical, action is responsible for
the end product produced.
"An article which comes into being through human and mechanical manip-
ulation of raw materials which in themselves are not active partners in the
transforming and creative process can be said to be a manufactured article.
' '
(Emphasis added.)
With regard to the making of synthetic compost the court continues, "In the
process under discussion the hay and corncobs participate in the chemical and
biological changes when water is poured over them and they are mixed, turned,
and moved in the air" 8, and because of this participation the process is not
manufacturing, but farming. (Emphasis added.) Although the hay, corncobs,
and chemicals, when completely processed, end up as an obviously new product
with a new use-artificial manure-the court concludes that: "the hay and
corncobs, at the termination of the process, have not emerged as distinctly new
articles. They are readily recognizable even in the final stage of the opera-
tion." "
The conclusion that the process is farming and not manufacturing, merely
because the hay and corncobs are visible and distinguishable in the finished
product, seems illogical. A more reasonable approach is illustrated by the
language of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in its interpretation of a zoning
ordinance in Marple Township v. Lynam:"°
"Webster ...defines "farm" as a piece of land held under lease for
cultivation; hence, any tract of land . . . devoted to agricultural purposes,
generally under the management of a tenant or owner; any parcel or group
of parcels of land cultivated as a unit." In the Century Dictionary it is defined
5 Gaspari v. Muhlenberg Township Board of Adjustment, 392 Pa. 7, 16, 139 A. 2d 544, 548
(1958).
OId. at 12, 139 A. 2d at 546.
7 Id. at 14, 139 A. 2d at 548.
8 Ibid.
DId. at 15, 139 A. 2d 548.
0 1051 Pa. Super. 288, 291, 30 A. 2d 208, 210 (1943).
1959.]
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as "A tract of land devoted to general or special cultivation under a single con-
trol, whether that of its owner or of a tenant: as a small farm, a wheat-, fruit-,
dairy-, or market farm." "Farming" is defined as "the commercial production
of any plant (even horticultural) or annual which has economic value."
The production of synthetic compost does not seem to conform to this
definition, nor does it fit the definitions of most other jurisdictions that have
defined the word. For example, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in con-
struing a zoning ordinance, has said that although the chief characteristic of
"farming" is the cultivation of the soil, other closely related activities, such as
grazing livestock, may be classed as "farming"," while Connecticut has held
that the dominant and distinguishing characteristic of "farming" is the culti-
vation of the soil for the production of crops therefrom. 2
It has been said that zoning regulations are the product of far sighted
planning on the part of the drafters, and that they are calculated to promote
the general welfare of the city and township at some future time.' The
primary purpose of zoning regulations is the promotion of the morals, safety,
welfare and prosperity of the community for which they were adopted. 4
Some courts, relying on the foregoing policy considerations, when consider-
ing a residential zone in which "farming" was a permissive use, have ruled
that certain activities more closely related to "farming" than artificial compost
processing were not "farming" and were excluded from the zone. The Supreme
Court of Connecticut, in construing a zoning ordinance for a residential dis-
trict in which farming was permitted, held as proper the refusal of a building
permit for a new hen house, when the appellant planned to use the land ex-
clusively for the raising of hens. The court said this was not farming." In
interpreting a similar statute, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts held as
proper the refusal of a building permit to the appellant for the construction of
a building to house hogs. He planned to use his land exclusively for the raising
of hogs. " A lower New York court, in upholding the refusal of a permit
for a building to house pigs, reasoned that the purpose of a zoning ordinance is
important, and that a purpose of the ordinance before it was to keep odors and
noise from the neighbors. 7
1 Town of Lincoln v. Murphy, 314 Mass. 16, 49 N.E. 2d 453 (1943).
12 Chudnov v. Board of Appeals of Town of Bloomfield, 113 Conn. 49, 154 Atl. 161 (1931).
1" Arverne Bay Construction Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E. 2d 587 (1938).
11 Chudnov v. Board of Appeals of Town of Bloomfield, 113 Conn. 49, 154 At. 161, 163
(1931).
1 Id. at 49, 154 Atl. at 161.
16 Town of Lincoln v. Murphy, 314 Mass. 16, 49 N.E. 2d 453 (1943),
17 Johnson v. Debaun, 135 N.Y.S. 2d 217, 206 Milc, 806 (1954),
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In the Gaspari Case the Pennsylvania court has given a broad, all inclusive
definition to the term "farming" while construing it with respect to a Farm
zone in which residences were permitted. Such a liberal interpretation of the
word should not be expected if the zone under consideration were a Residence
zone with farming merely a permissive use, as seen in the foregoing Massa-
chusetts and Connecticut decisions."8 Undoubtedly the Pennsylvania court, if
faced with the Gaspari facts, but in a Residential zone with farming merely a
permissive use, would strictly construe "farming" and hold that artificial com-
post processing is not included within that term.
Assuming the production of synthetic compost is not farming, can it be
called manufacturing? It is the opinion of this writer that it can. The earliest
definition of "manufacturing" set forth by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was
in Norris Bros. v. Commonwealth:"-
"It is making. To make in the mechanical sense does not signify to create
out of nothing; for that surpasses all human power. It does not often mean
the production of a new article out of materials entirely raw. It generally con-
sists in giving new shapes, new qualities, or new combinations to matter which
has already gone through some other artificial process."
A federal court, in construing a tax statute, has said "... that manufacture
means the creation or production of a product from raw materials or by com-
bining two or more products to form a new and different one." 20 There are
no Pennsylvania appellate decisions construing the term "manufacturing"
with respect to zoning statutes, but several cases necessitated an interpretation
of the term. In Commonwealth v. Peerless Paper Specialty 21 the court held
that the production of gummed paper by blending various glues and securing
them to one side of the paper was manufacturing. In a recent case it was held
that the designing, marking, selling, and erecting of cemetery monuments is
manufacturing, the court basing its decision on the fact that a new and different
product had been produced.22 The production of concrete by the mixture of
sand, stone and water was deemed manufacturing in Commonwealth v.
McCrady-Rodgers Co." The court there declared that "a thing is a manu-
factured article when the product is a new and different article with a dis-
tinctive name, character, or use." 24 In Commonwealth v. Snyder's Bakery,2 5
1See notes 15 and 16, supra.
19 27 Pa. 494, 496 (1856).
20 Charles Marchand Co. v. Higgins, 36 F. Supp. 792, 795 (1940).
21 344 Pa. 283, 25 A. 2d 323 (1942).
22 Horigan v. City of Pittsburgh, 178 Pa. Super. 558, 116 A. 2d 228 (1955),
23 316 Pa. 155, 174 At. 395 (1934).
24 Id. at 158, 174 AtI. at 396.
25348 Pa. 308, 35 A. 2d 260 (1944).
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a raw material, potatoes, underwent a chemical, or natural change and the
finished product-potato chips-was deemed to have been manufactured. The
court said "This is not a case where there has been a mere chemical change in
the article itself . . . . [The potato] is changed to a new, different, and
useful article . . . . Chemically, too, there has been a complete change." 20
The mere fact that the processing of artificial compost requires a natural,
or chemical, change in the materials does not preclude it from being manu-
facturing. The presence or absence of chemical action on the raw materials
used in a process should have no bearing on the determination of whether or
not the process is manufacturing. The Supreme Court of the United States
has said, "Manufacture implies a change, but every change is not manufacturing,
and yet every change in an article is the result of treatment, labor, and manipu-
lation. But something more is necessary . . . .There must be transforma-
tion; a new and different article must emerge, 'having a distinctive name,
character, or use.' "27 The Gasparis mixed hay, corncobs and chemicals and
produced a new and exceedingly different article-artificial horse manure-by
a manufacturing process.
The common law recognized that certain harmful or offensive uses of
land, called "nuisances", could be regulated and prohibited, long before local
government officials began enacting zoning ordinances." Although the Gas-
pari Case is not a "nuisance" action, the production of artificial compost on such
a large scale, by creating noxious odors, drawing flies, and invading the land of
neighbors with putrid liquids, could in fact be a "nuisance". In considering an
activity similar to that of the Gasparis, the Supreme Court of Delaware, in
Cain v. Foggero," enjoined as a nuisance the actions of the defendant in storing
manure and operating his mushroom houses in such a manner as to interfere
with the comfort and well being of his neighbors."
It is difficult to conceive that the Muhlenberg Township Zoning Com-
mission, in establishing this "F" Farm District for farms and single and double
family dwellings, had in mind the later permissive use of the land in such a
manner as it is now being used by the Gasparis.
EUGENE J. BREW, JR.
261d. at 310, 35 A. 2d at 261.
27 Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n v. United States, 207 U.S. 556, 562 (1908).
2 8 
LIEBERMAN AND RABIN, LAW OF ZONING IN PENNSYLVANIA, p. 5, 1958.
2928 Del. Ch. 131, 38 A. 2d 735 (1944).
30 The defendant piled large amounts of horse manure on his land prior to using it in his
mushroom houses. The resultant stench was "sickening an.d upbe.rgble," find the piles proved a
breeding place for flies,
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